



The Role of the United States in the Iran-Israel Conflict: An Analysis

Zainab¹, Afira Mujeeb², Dr. Muhammad Shabbir³ & Dr. Ghulam Mustafa⁴

¹ MPhil. Scholar, Department of International Relations, Government College University Faisalabad.

² PhD Scholar, Department of International Relations, Government College University Faisalabad.

³ (Correspondence Author) Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, Bahauddin Zakariya University, Multan Email: shabbirch@bzu.edu.pk

⁴ Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Government College University Faisalabad.

Abstract

The Iran-Israel struggle, while now not an immediate warfare, reveals decades of geopolitical tensions founded in ideological, non-secular, and regional electricity dynamics. Since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Iran has put itself in competition with Israel, demanding its eradication, while aiding proxy corporations like Hezbollah and Hamas. Israel, in turn, considers Iran's effect and nuclear goals as existential dangers, leading to covert actions, hacking, and strikes on Iranian-subsidized forces in Syria. The United States has played a crucial role in this war, moving between diplomatic attempts, navy techniques, and financial sanctions. After the 1979 revolution and the hostage catastrophe, the U.S. imposed sanctions on Iran, siding extra solidly with Israel. Over the years, Washington sought to comprise Iran's effect via numerous techniques, including arms embargos and labeling the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist commercial enterprise. For a long time, we have seen varying U.S. strategies—from Obama's diplomatic attempts through the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to Trump's pullout from the deal and a "most pressure" marketing campaign towards Iran. Israel has rejected the JCPOA, fearing it might empower Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. The Abraham Accords, which normalized members of the family among Israel and many Arab states, attempted to offset Iran's impact. In parallel, the U.S. has worked to prevent a direct navy escalation between Israel and Iran, regardless of rising regional instability.

Keywords

Middle East Tensions, Iran-Israel War, Proxy War, US Foreign Policy, Diplomatic Relations, Global Power Dynamics

Introduction

Recent conflicts in the Middle Eastern region have brought to closure a shared concern in media and news reporting, instructional material, and politics. The place has variety of violence and is enclosed by several dates most of which are long standing conflicts. The phrase "Middle East exceptionalism" is nevertheless employed to explain the sector's failure to transition to "democracy," degeneration, ad human rights. Recent conflicts that have added on to this potential include Sunni versus Shiite, Arab Persian, the State of Israel in the eyes of Muslims, and the hatred between Iran and the United States. It is often attempted to detect numerous incompatibilities referring to a broad variety of behavioral and attitudinal consequences which characterize persistent confrontation (Singh, 2024).

Terrorism in Iran is high, and Iran is one of the few countries with all the following: the largest Shia Muslim population, the fourth-largest oil reserves, a track record of funding and supporting militaries and political factions in the region and multiple American-based terrorist organizations. Iran can be said to have had a significant role in the American foreign policy coverage after the formation of the Islamic Republic following the revolution in the same year 1979. Iran and its endeavors have been described as a threat to the US and its interests by every subsequent US administration. More attention can be paid to the Iranian government's nuclear power, military forces,

sponsorship of militias and terrorist organizations, and relationship with Russia and China. In order to curb the Iranian menace, the U.S. administration employs the following policy tools; diplomacy, limited warfare and sanctions. The attempts made by Iran's enemies have not severely eroded its strategic assets and strategic importance in this region as they may have rather enhanced it (Inbar, 2020).

Despite Congress dominating in sanctions, financial support for regional friends, and overseeing nuclear deal, it has played a vital role towards improving relations between USA and Iran. A lot of this parliamentary diversions were indeed oriented to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that limited the scope of the Iranian nuclear program in exchange for sanction relief. However, the United States pull out from the agreement in 2018, under the Trump presidency. The reactions of lawmakers to efforts that were made to bring back the JCPOA in 2021–2022 under Biden was not totally harmonious. By late 2022 the JCPOA lost its significance for several reasons: first, the talks were delayed due to the unrest across Iran; and second, Iran supports Russia in the Ukraine war (Payne, 2023).

On September 16, 2019, the Senate began an inquiry into the \$6 billion in Iranian property and the swap of prisoners between the United States and Iran. The conflict escalate further after October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel, then Iranian sponsored militias began to target US forces in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. The confrontation aggravated even further when in April 2024, Iran targeted Israel with missile and drone attacks switched to a much more direct army-like confrontation in the battle of words. In response, an emergency bill that gave tougher sanctions against Iran was approved by the Congress. When Iran said it would exact revenge for the July 2024 murder of Hamas chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, which reports said was with Israeli help, the local temperature rose. The United States on its part increased the number of navy personnel it deployed in the region. Future actions by Iran can reach certain conclusions relying on internal variables, for instance, its recently Israel and Hamas are at the moment discussing ceasefire, a reformist president has been recently elected and other strategic options, ranging from airstrikes or attacks on Israelis abroad, are being considered (Mühlberger, 2024).

Iran, Hamas, and the October 7, 2023, Attacks on Israel:

Since the formation of Hamas in the eighties Iran has endorsed the group offering it logistical and funding support even at the time when Israel and Egypt impose their emplaced ban on Gaza. Hamas has engaged Israel in various conflicts since seizing control of Gaza in 2007 and has employed Iranian delivered rockets capable of hitting critical Israeli targets. The US State Department said Iran financially sponsors those groups through approximately up to \$100 million annually to Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist organizations. After the subsequent October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel, US and Israeli commanders stated that Iran has been systematically supporting the organization through logistical means but it was not confirmed that Iran had a hand in planning and certainly not in the execution of the act. The 2024 U.S. Intelligence Community's Annual Threat Assessment highlighted that, although al-Qaeda has been supporting Hamas tactically for years but has been seen getting involved directly in a limited manner, and Iran was neither coordinating, nor had knowledge with expertise in the October 7 attack; it was detected this was not so. Disparate data was brought to the public attention in a number of media sources in October 2023, given anonymous sources within the authorities, who actually argued over the extent of Iran's involvement in the strike (Dryden, 2023).

The high-ranking military of the IRGC was killed in an Israeli airstrike near Damascus on April 1, 2024; Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi, who led the operations in Syria and Lebanon. Israeli commanders complained that a military objective with Quds troops undercover of civilians was attacked, irrespective of Iranian belongings insisting targets were diplomatic. Expecting further provocation, the United States acted to Iranian threats of reprisal by bringing more military hardware to the region. Iran began its direct air strike on Israel on 13th April for the first time with support from Iranian allied forces in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. The Russian strike also used ballistic and cruise missiles ranging between 300 and 350 of them, in addition to the assault drones. Although some did not succeed or were shot down by Israeli and allied air defense facilities, those that fell did not do much damage. Hence, though U.S analysts and Israeli operatives considered it an attack meant to cause colossal damage, Iran has been accused of under-reporting the extent of the damage. In this regard, the U.S. officers considered the strike as an ironizr embarrassing failure for Iran credited to poor) made and pre-detection of the attacks. Nevertheless, the tragedy played a signal role in

switching relations between Israel and Iran to a different level. The IRGC is the abbreviated form of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The commander also noted that Iranian response may be fast if Israel attacked Iranian facilities (Sharp & Thomas, 2024).

Washington beseeched Israel not to conduct mopping up operations after the event. On April 19, however, as Iran has claimed, Israel struck an asset on the outskirts of an Iranian navy base in Isfahan. This much-publicized ostensibly preplanned attack by the US is claimed to have blown up the radar of an S-300 surface-to-air missile that can be used to justify Iran's defenses around the nuclear plants; in effect showing that Israel can overcome those defenses. While trying to play down the event, Iran had stood ready to respond vigorously to any future actions by Israel (Mahmoudian, 2024).

Research Questions:

1. How has the U.S. approach to sanctions in opposition to Iran affected the escalation or de-escalation of hostilities between Iran and Israel?

Research Methodology:

The main concern of this research is to explore how the struggle between Iran and Israel is aggravating conflicts that lead to devastating consequences for regional and international security. In what way(s) do the diplomatic efforts enhance the conditions of peace and order in the relations between Iran and Israel with continuous fights, proxy wars and palms race? The participation of the US adds a layer to this condition of occurrences with its foreign reporting choices and provides armed forces support to Israel at the same time that sanctions are against Iran.

Literature Review

The work "*Iran, Israel, and the Struggle for the Skies over the Middle East*" by Joshua Dryden (2023) examines and analyses how and why both Israel and Iran, in a Lightning Storm of rivalry, adapt their strategies of air power. Dryden has been proved that each US has designed tremendous air dominance plans which consist of their strategic objectives and operational conditions. This paper reveals that Iran depends on hard security strategies and faces the constraint of conventional aerial force. This strategy is seeks to prevent Israel and other adversaries from having it easy by exerting operational costs through proxies apart from the Hezbollah and Houthi forces. In addition, as a way of consolidating its influence locally Iran also supplies its partners with air defense and missile systems. Existential Threat has been depicted by Israel using a more proactive air campaign that includes a "Campaign between the Wars" it has been implementing bombing of Iranian targets and its proxies in Syria and Lebanon. And save yourself the opportunity to consolidate Iran's governance. This paper also discusses the increasing role of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in all configurations of the US armed forces. Sometimes UAVs are used for intelligence and pinpoint operations, such as by Israel, while Iran has also used UAVs covert reconnaissance and using them as projectile, and proxies have utilized them in local wars such as the 2006 Lebanon War and attacks in Yemen (Dryden, 2023).

Efraim Inbar's (2020) "*Iran and Israel: The Inevitable War*" examines those circumstances which, taking into account the geopolitics of the Middle East, will inevitably lead to an armed conflict between the two countries. Inbar opines that Iran's animosity with Israel is Geopolitical, Intellectual and Religious. It supports Israel's measures of defense but also states Iranian intentions of dominance in the Middle East. Some of the ways this fight is carried is by Tehran seeking to become more powerful in Syria and Iraq; its seeking the use of proxy in Gaza thru Palestinian Islamic Jihad and in Lebanon thru Hezbollah. They suggested the Israeli had no choice but to attack Iran militarily and demanded again to exert severe force in order to neutralize Iran's nuclear weapons program The book also describes how the advancement in geopolitics especially unstable and weak Arab governments, shifting US policies, and the new axis Israel-Sunni Arab states coax Iran to act more assertive (Inbar, 2020).

"*A US Strategy for Iran*" by Charles A. Douglass and Michael D. Hays (2008) provides a critique of the current course US policy toward Iran while proposing new paradigms. The authors also claim that tighter negative pressures have to be complemented with a positive dialogue with Iran and that a given policy has to take into consideration Iran's complacent, nationalist, and pragmatic behaviour. As how previous US attempts are unable to halt Iran's nuclear ambitions or alter the its destabilizing activities, they examine Iran's financial, maritime and political moves. The authors reach the conclusion that by shifting previous boundaries to decorate mutual data, the relationship between the two foreign sites can be gradually reconstructed. This shift in approach underscores just how

strategic and time-consuming planning has to be in order to address the difficult and intricate tasks Iran is aiding (Hays, 2008).

"Risk and Rivalry: Iran, Israel, and the Bomb" by Colin H. Kahl, Melissa G. Dalton (2012), and Matthew Irvine The work offers a detailed and extensive analysis of the relationship between Iran's nuclear programmes and the Israeli threat perceptions. The authors maintain that while a nuclear-armed Iran would not spiral into large scale conflict, it would nonetheless escalate tensions in the region. Rather it will be about the ways in which nuclear weapons could reshape deterrence, naval power and balance of power in a particular theatre of operation and patterns of coalitions and alliances in the given region. The authors say that the current situation requires turning the current state of affairs upside down through Iranian retaliation against the numerous Israeli naval deterrent actions. The proclamation also looks at the returns of the action of the United States in the statement that the concern of safety of Israel and nuclear aims and objectives of Iran may best be solved through containment, diplomacy and war. The peculiarities of the Iran-Israel relationship and the conditions that may characterize potential solutions to the nuclear dilemma are underlined in this literature; the concept of strategic caution, 'international family members', as well as the United States, is also included (Colin H. Kahl, 2012).

Literature Gap:

These are some of the gaps which have reflected a lack of international focus, lack of understanding of domestic politics and public opinion, and a weak assessment of the balance of political and economic influence. Since the bilateral relations involve nuclear weapons, arms proliferation, proxy conflicts, and US military politics and strategies, these topics are closely researched in the literature.

Historical Background:

Israel and the United States had a tactical mutual understanding in the sense that both Iran and Israel have secret cooperation which was evident as the Shiite cleric returned to Tehran in February 1979 while Israel was blessed with its state hood in May 1948. The periphery doctrine formulated by Ben-Gurion with the methodology of preventing threat from Arab countries by partnering with Non-Arab countries such as Iran, Turkey, and Kurds was the base of forming the strategy. During Mohammed Reza Shah of Iran and Israel like Iran feared militant Pan-Arab led by Nasser of Egypt and both did not trust Soviet interference into the region. As was stated by Ben-Gurion in 1960 the relations between the two countries were based on mutual interest (Furlan, Israeli-Iranian relations: past friendship, current hostility, 2022). This cooperation depends on the conditions of the Iranian plan to pump more oil and on the energy needs of Israel. There was little hope of getting Egyptian or Syrian oil due to the current Arab economic boycott of Israel and hence, reliance on non-Arab Iran, with its oil resources.

Since the early 1950s the relationship between the two countries flourished and the high point of this cooperation was achieved in 1967 Six Day War by building the Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline. The pipeline enhanced Iran's revenues since it enabled it export its oil directly to the European market and also serve the Israeli market.

The relations seen between the Israel and Iran had the following benefits. Iran allowed the Iraqi Jews who were exiled to return to Israel after the war in year 1948. Iran allowed Israel to support Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq during the 1960s and 1970s, as well as Peshmerga guerrillas, while the Shah dreamed of invading the Persian Gulf and annihilating Baghdad. The Shah also strongly assumed that cooperation with Israel would bring modernization process in Iran, and contribute to better relations with the White House. Therefore, many experts and contractors today from Israel are involved in infrastructure, agriculture and military contracts in Iran. The Spanish and Portuguese congregation was formed during this time and a Hebrew school was established in Tehran Likewise, the flight between Tel Aviv and Tehran became direct (Furlan, 2022).

There was a number of domains Iran and Israel had a mutually beneficial cooperation in the 90s. In 1948 Iranian policy even facilitated for the Iraqi Jews to leave Iraq to move to Israel. Iran allowed Israel to support Kurds in Iraq in the 1960s and 1970s to help the Shah spread political instability and topple Baghdad. The relation between the two countries was strengthen by establishing the direct flights between Tel Aviv and Tehran, as well as by constructing a Hebrew school in Tehran during this period. Open conflicts such as the 2006 Lebanon war started portraying increasing hostility of Iran against Israel. This conflict that was mostly between Israel and a Shiite group in Lebanon namely Hezbollah showed Iran's rising regional power as well as its capability to match

Israel in asymmetric warfare. The escalation occurred in 2018 when Iran carried out the first direct attack on Israeli soil to respond to an Israeli operation attacking the Iranian consulate in Damascus. Iran dramatically ramped up its own military operations and affiliated militias in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, which has greatly raised temperatures in the region (Bukhari & Haq, 2024).

U.S. Influence in the Middle Eastern Geopolitics:

The Middle Eastern region has base and stations of the United States military. Two of these are the 5th Fleet headquarters in Manama, Bahrain and the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar where all US stock can fit. While Israel has procured only installations of anti-ballistic missiles, Egypt has not been supplied any combat troops although they have a strategic and very close military alliance. Iran currently has many points throughout the country and continue reading including operating bases, air fields and sighting locations. It is estimated that 60, 000- 70, 000 soldiers deployed across the region in 2020 (Institute, 2020).

Three consecutive US presidents, Obama, Trump, and Biden, have tried to scale down the US military in order to exit from failed operations, and then seek to rebalance it for a new spree against China. However, they have failed to meet their obligations. Controversially, Barack Obama in his 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance vowed to cut the military expenditure and pull out of Middle East war when he actually was engaged in Iraq and the Islamic State of Syria wars. In fantastic large arms sales deals with Saudi Arabia as well as the Emirates, Trump likewise demanded minimizing military involvement. In spite of using force sometimes, he was unable to stop drones attacks on Saudi oil facilities, which were mostly blamed on Iran, it marked the beginning of the Gulf War in 2019 (Lu, 2021).

To this meant, that the United States was no more trust worthy in the Middle East. Subsequently, aspects of the new force structure seems to be quite clear, despite Biden's delay in its execution. Maybe following the earlier agreements with the European frontline states the new organization will not need large operational sites and bases but will need a number of support centers that are prepared to let the forces in should the need arise. There is no better place for the US to set up these zones than at the strategic national airfields and navy bases where there are so and so American's can come and go and deposit any type of weapon they want without the host nation consent. But maintaining the commitments of a large military force on the ground together with the ambiguity of force management from a distance poses major challenges for diplomacy (Lodgaard, 2023).

U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East:

European countries started developing relations in the 19th century with the Middle East specifically after the World War I through League of Nations. The foreign policy of the United States was in some way limited in the region. Cold War made concerns about Middle East worse in the 1950s. Since many fled political instability in Iran, Palestine, Lebanon and Afghanistan in the 1970s, the United States policy changed in 1965 to permit more of these people in on humanitarian grounds. The relations with the United States were also influenced by the political instabilities and the energy link through Middle Eastern oil. Defining and planning the military, political and economic activities in the Middle East, the Carter Doctrine has been a foundation of the American approach since the time Carter unveiled it in 1980s. The Doctrine's greatest component was its "overarching U.S. purpose to prevent 'any foreign force to seize control of the Persian Gulf region'. This part of the Doctrine stemmed out from the U.S. interest in the Middle Eastern oil at the period (Alnasrawi, 1989).

Iran was invaded by British and Soviet forces in the 1940s and subsequent tensions between from Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlevi and nationalist Prime Minister Mossadeq when a communist coup plot in 1949 proved unsuccessful. Ali Abdol-Mossadeq Since the early twentieth century, the Shah attempted to overthrow Mossadeq, who was then sent into exile in Iran. When take control Mossadeq and the shah was restored in 1953 with the help of British American operation to suppress the fear of communism. The Islamic religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini came back from exile to power when the shah was forced to leave to the United States because of anti-shah riots in January 1979. A crisis instigated in 1979 November in Tehran Iran, some Iranian students stormed the US Embassy and took the embassy staff hostage for 444 days in an effort to have the Shah who was in US treated for his ailment, returned to Iran to stand trial. This remained the case and escalated mid 2000s due to sanctions and scepticism of Iran's uranium program. President Obama and Iran's president Rouhani had their first phone conversation since 1979 in 2013. In their first meetings, they discussed

the disputative JCPOA, “the nuclear deal in which Iran committed to the nuclear limits in exchange for the easing of certain sanctions”. The United States, Britain, China, France, Germany, and Russia obtained an agreement In July 2015. The particular r-Dpi was started by the United States in May 2018 and withdrawn (Asghar, 2019).

Israel and Palestine:

After the World War I, the League of Nation ‘assigned the Mandate for Palestine to Great Britain in regards to the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which declared that the British Government would be ‘favourable to the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people’. Jerusalem was still under international control long after its division by the UN Resolution 181 put together the former British Mandate into Jewish-Arab state in Mid-1948. In as much as the United States recognized the State of Israel many times, the “resolution angered Palestinian Jews and Arab groups which triggered the 1948 Palestine Arab – Israeli war. However, there were Sino-Israeli relations, conflict with Iraq and Egypt because in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan Palestinians maintained guerrilla groups. After the war years of struggle includes, Yom Kippur struggle in October 1973, Six- Day War July 1967, invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and in Lebanon August 2006. More over United States has been active from 1990s to resolve the Israel Palestinian conflict. The PA administrative and governmental apparatus in Palestine since its establishment was the outcome of the agreement signed between Israel and the PLO in 1994 which granted the PA limited control of Gaza and some areas in the West Bank in which a vast majority of Palestinian population resides at the present. Nevertheless, the Palestinian Authority (PA), which is a group partly supported by Iran, but officially recognized by the United States as a non-state actor and a terrorist organization controls only this narrow strip of the West Bank despite the fact that Hamas, Another U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization sponsored in part by Iran has been ruling in Gaza since 2007. Airstrikes between Israel and Hamas continues to cause high tensions (Robinson, 2023).

Iran Nuclear Program:

The British defense weekly Jane’s Defence Weekly’ released the startling and startling headline,” Iran is making an atomic weapon to be ready in two years –Persian Gulf press last week”, on April 24, 1984. By extrapolating on the amount of time that would take West German technical firms to build one of two 1,300-megawatt nuclear reactors that remain incomplete in Bushehr-an Iranian beachside city under construction for nearly ten years the article made its prediction The State Department puts the time to complete construction of the reactors in Bushehr in two to three years; the reactors ‘are not particularly well-suited for a weapons programme’. In its warning, the State Department added, “prior acts of the Government of Iran do not afford us great confidence that it will always respect its international obligations” (K.Kerr, 2024).

The reactor started only operating in May 2011 after attaining criticality. The bushehr reactor was closed for technical reasons and for regular maintenance during the two former known IAEA vi visits to the Bushehr in August and October last year. It is also practically implausible for Iran to surreptitiously produce, steal, and reprocess spent material to make less than eight kilo-grammes of plutonium—the ‘special quantity,’ the IAEA states is required to build a single nuclear weapon—because Bushehr site is amenable to ‘physical inventory verification’. In another way, though, the State Department's 1984 warning was correct: Indeed, Iran had failed one of its NPT Safeguards Agreement obligations contained in the May 1974 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. “A November 2007 IAEA report has pointed out that Iran failed to acquire more nuclear fuel cycle facilities or technologies overseas,” the paper states. Ever since it became a declared objective, Iran says that it led to a decision to procure nuclear enrichment technologies illicitly mid-1980s (Khan, 2015).

In a secret internal working document reported by the IAEA, then President Ali Hoseyni Khamenei told Iran’s top military and political leaders in April 1984 that he was reviving the country’s nuclear programme to shield the Islamic revolution from ‘external threats. It was not until August 2002 that Iran’s material NPT violations were disclosed by NSG and occasionally credible National Council of Resistance of Iran (Zenko, 2012).

Israel, Iran, and Proxy Wars in the Middle East:

The use of proxy warfare as the main form of foreign policy is directly connected with Iran’s participation. The Shia militias in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan; the Houthi rebel movement in Yemen, Ansar Allah; and, undoubtedly Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon are most important

proxies Iran supports. This way Iran implicitly supports the asymmetric war against the United States in the second line and Israel in the first line. Iran funds, supplies and cipher several organizations in foreign states through Quds Force of the Iranian Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC-QF) which encompasses in guerrilla warfare and espionage Hassan Nasrallah the general secretary of Hezbollah was recently forced to acknowledge that the Iranian experts were involved in the process of converting rockets to precision missiles two years earlier. Iran uses a proxy to gain more tangible space among Middle Eastern and Islamic countries in general, to avoid having a direct confrontation with Israel and the United States of America, and to save its economic, military, and people capital (Thomas, Iran-Supported Groups in the Middle East and U.S. Policy, 2024).

Hezbollah's strategic capabilities:

Hezbollah arms: According to an estimation, it possesses 150000-200000 rocket missiles light arms tanks drones and long-range installation rockets. Further, the group's ranks include 40,000 to 50,000 active and reserve warriors. Because of what it calls the Hezbollah 'state within a state' in Lebanon, military power, and with close links to Iran, it is considered to be one of the most powerful non-state actors in the world today. Hezbollah has managed to attack Israel as from October 7, 2023, and penetrate air defense as well as cause casualties. However, further policy may be affected by death of Hassan Nasrallah and the fact that the organization is gradually losing its leaders. Temporary abatement of the organization would impose a negative impact on the operation of the organization and on Iran in the region (Bouchnik-Chen, 2021).

Hamas' strategic capabilities:

The leadership of Hamas might be affected a lot if Yahya Sinwar dies. He also served as one of the major military commanders stationed in the Gaza strip and led the invasion on October 7. Hamas' unity was not an issue that suffered with the replacement of Haniyeh with Sinwar, however the organization's leadership now suffers from some of the same issues as Hezbollah. The murder of Hamas executives might make the situation for Israel worse because Haniyeh, who could negotiate with Qatar, is now a part of the picture. But Israel wants to kill every Hamas leader, and the name of the game in war is to aim high and go for the top. Hajjin also learned that even if Hamas's forces have been brought down Israel still feels that the top Hamas commanders can still mount attacks. So, I can state the status is still tense, as Israeli intelligence is focusing on the processes, taking place in the country (Wilson, 2015).

Israel's political objectives and defensive strategy:

Israel has cleverly shifted attention from the West Bank which it has signalled could be fully annexed in time, to eliminate Hamas in Gaza. The sixty percent resource rich Area C of the West Bank was given even more control by the IDF on May 29 by transferring the civil administration responsibilities to Israeli government official. Even though according to the international law it is prohibited this change enables building of Israeli settlements in the area. About 750000 people or one-tenth of Israel's population live in the West Bank today. The move against the partner of Iran in Lebanon is with the clear aim of weakening Iran which is Israel's nemesis. Israel's strategic aim is, therefore, to demoralize both Iran and Hezbollah but at the same time achieve Iran's isolation from its border as well as from Hamas. Like in the UN Resolution 1701, this tactic also involve denying the group led by Hezbollah beyond the Litani River. Despite Israel still following after Hezbollah in southern Lebanon with a reckless abandon, it has proven more difficult given the fact that Hezbollah's leadership is incredibly weak and the regional coalition backed by Iran has more formidable opposition (Canale, 2024).

Iran-Israel War navigating by Gulf states:

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries had a crucial decision when the Gaza conflict started a year ago: Would they stand with Israel and America against Iran which backs Hamas, Hezbollah and other terroristic groups against Israel? Or would they prefer a more autonomous foreign policy in accord with the sunni Gulf states and the exact idea of a new Middle East order to move away from the American-Israeli project? Though, despite Washington and Tel Aviv presenting partnerships with the Gulf as entirely successful, the agreements which were made are indeed far more complicated. especially after the agreement on the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran in March 2023, the GCC countries have opted for interaction, not isolation, discussion instead of the use of force, and diplomacy rather than confrontation since 2021 (Urhová, 2024).

During the Donald Trump administration, KSA, Bahrain, and the UAE openly supported the US' 'maximum pressure' campaign of Iran to contain Tehran through lectures of power by Washington and its ally Israel. This of course is quite in contrast to that period. This strategy began changing in 2018 when Trump exited the Iran, 2015 nuclear deal and there was an increase in military tensions between 2018 and 2020. According to sources, Groups backed by Iran launched specific strikes on the energy sector in both KSA and UAE. There has been a general rise in diplomatic relations between Iran and the countries in the GCC. For example, the Saudi crown prince recently invited the ex – Iranian president, Ebrahim Raisi to KSA, for an emergency Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) meeting, as soon as the massacre in Gaza began. The two countries held a high level interaction for nearly a decade. The Gulf states enhanced contact with Tehran after Iran started missile and drone strikes on Israel, reciprocating the bombing of the Iranian embassy by the Israelis in Damascus in April 2024. The progress towards reunion was evident by the interaction that followed Raisi's death in of a helicopter crash in May, and the fact that many GCC officials attended his funeral (Molavi, 2010).

by April and October this year Iran fired missiles and drones at Israel fanning the concern in the entire gulf region. Previous discourses by the GCC states on Iran's development of ballistic missiles has therefore only been amplified by these recent discussions. Another is the likelihood of Iran to build nuclear weapon. Iran may use its nuclear program in this fashion because, as we witnessed, Israeli attacks have inflicted harm to Hamas and Hezbollah. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, both possessing still nascent, albeit rapidly advancing nuclear programs are watching the situation from the side-lines as the global community starts to understand the nature of nuclear threat originating from the region. They are very much concerned with the prospects of these wars even though the GCC nations support these Israeli wars against Hamas and Hezbollah. Economic objectives of the GCC may be negatively impacted for many years due to the long-standing conflict between Israel and Iran or between USA and Iran. Bear in mind that this sector is already struggling with disruptions and a constant rise in expenses affecting tourism and aviation (Salem, et al., 2024).

Thus, instead of aggravating a full-scale war and expanding their vision of a prosperous and friendly future, the Gulf states are trying to mediate between Tehran, Tel Aviv, and Washington. "We want to close for ever the chapter of our troubles and to deal with challenges, to work on strengthening relations as two friendly and brotherly countries," SAudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal said to Pezeshkian in Doha (Haghirian, 2024).

Conclusion:

Since the Iranian revolution in 1979: Iran- Israel relations differ. Iranian leadership has been benefiting from ideological ways in developing its strategic presence in Africa and other countries. The number of Iranian administrations itself has been quite many and every one of them has enacted policies of its kind during its incumbency; these factors, inter alia, include the capabilities of the incumbent government in terms of financial capacity; the perception of the international community towards the state of Iran; and political ideologies that binds it to the most conservative political personalities. Feeling of hostility between Israel and Iran and the publicization of their 'silent war' have escalated chances of going to a full scale battle. As for the security cooperation that has caused Iran to call off its strike against Israel on the evening of April 13, it would also attract other nations in the region as well as international ones. The will and capacity of Israel and Iran respectively to act will determine whether Iran's strike will be met with an Israeli response and whether Iran is capable of forcing restoration of the anti-Iranian deterrent that existed before the April 14 attack. These conditions and avoiding a new regional conflict are the objectives of the Biden administration (Bazoobandi & Talebian, 2023).

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